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JURISDICTION 
The State of Utah appeals from a pretrial dismissal of charges on one count of 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, and one count of 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, after the magistrate found that 
the State lacked sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, and therefore refused to 
bind Defendant over for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
1 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Is it within a magistrate's discretion to dismiss charges after a preliminary 
hearing when the State's evidence fails to support a reasonable inference that the accused 
committed the alleged offense? 
Standard of Review: While the State's appellant brief, relying on State v. Norris, 
2001 UT 104, % 14,48 P.3d 872, does state the proper standard of review for a 
magistrate's probable cause finding—it is reviewed for correctness—the State omitted an 
important portion from the same paragraph of the Norris opinion: "We afford the 
magistrate's decision great deference". Id. (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 
(Utah 1993)(internal quotations omitted)). In State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, f27, 137 P.3d 
787, another case cited by the State for the appropriate standard of review, the Court 
explained that a magistrate's decision whether or not to bindover a defendant for trial 
must be given commensurate deference by the appellate court. In Virgin, the Court stated 
the greatest degree of deference must be given to a magistrate's decision when "the facts 
to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately 
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out." Id. at ^28 (quoting State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). In Mr. Ramirez's case, the pivotal legal question 
was whether Mr. Ramirez was in constructive possession of drug residue and 
paraphernalia. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that constructive possession is a 
"highly fact-sensitive determination." See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^  14, 985 P.2d 
2 
911 (determining whether a defendant had constructively possessed drugs and 
paraphernalia discovered during a traffic stop.) 
Therefore, the appropriate standard of review of the magistrate's decision is for 
correctness, with a high degree of deference given to the magistrate's decision. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES1 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(l)(i) (West Supp. 2009) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Patrick Robert Ramirez, the Defendant and Appellee, was charged with Possession 
or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West 2009), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2009). After the State failed to produce 
sufficient evidence for the magistrate to find probable cause at the preliminary hearing, 
Mr. Ramirez was not bound over for trial, and the charges were dismissed. (R. 36.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
While incarcerated in Washington County Jail, Mr. Ramirez was overheard by a 
jailor asking a female to go and retrieve a glass pipe from a motel room he had previously 
occupied. (R. 41 at 6:19-20.) At that point the jailor contacted Washington County's 
1 A copy of the applicable statutes is included in the Appellant's Addenda as Addendum 
A. 
2 A copy of Mr. Ramirez's preliminary hearing transcript is included in the State's 
Addenda as Addendum C. 
3 
Drug Task Force. (R. 41 at 7:1-8:9.) The Jailor then asked Mr. Ramirez to speak with 
someone with the task force because the task force wanted to search the motel room 
without Mr. Ramirez present. (R. 41 at 8:18.) Mr. Ramirez complied, and while 
incarcerated and some 12 miles away from the motel room, the drug task force performed 
a warrantless search of the room, which they justified by keeping the incarcerated Mr. 
Ramirez on the phone while the search of the room took place.3 (R. 41 at 12:4-13:18.) 
After the police recovered the unused pipe4, they requested consent from Mr. Ramirez to 
search the rest of the motel room. (R. 41 at 13:19-14-3.) Mr. Ramirez, believing that the 
unused pipe was the only illegal item in the room, consented to the search of the rest of 
the motel room, whereupon a small baggie with trace amounts of methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia were discovered. (R. 41 at 14:5-19, 18:18-22.) On cross examination, an 
officer who was present during the search conceded that numerous individuals had access 
to the interior of the motel room, including the manager, housekeeping, or anyone else 
with a key to the room. (R. 41 at 23:9-14.) 
3 In the appellant's brief, the State refers to the motel as Mr. Ramirez's living quarters. 
See (Br. Appt. at 4 n.2.) However, it is important to note that the State did not introduce 
any evidence that signified the nature of Mr. Ramirez's business at the motel, the extent 
of his stay, or how many other individuals were in the motel room. As such, the 
magistrate was free to draw his own inferences from these important factors, and not 
necessarily in a light most favorable to the prosecution. 
4 Because Mr. Ramirez's reasons for asking the police to retrieve the pipe were related to 
other pending charges, it was unnecessary for this case's record to be "illuminating as to 
why [he] thought finding a clean glass pipe in his living quarters would exonerate him of 
pending drug charges". (Br. Appt. at 4 n. 1.) 
4 
Magistrates Ruling 
In his order denying the bindover of Mr. Ramirez, the magistrate stated that his 
decision was made from the evidence presented, the applicable statute, and current Utah 
case law. Based on the above information, the magistrate decided that the State did not 
produce evidence that could support an inference that Mr. Ramirez was in possession, or 
even aware, of the residue and other paraphernalia, and as such, could not have had the 
requisite intent to exercise control or dominion over them. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is a magistrate's duty at the preliminary hearing to ferret out groundless and 
improvident prosecutions. It is appropriate, and necessary, for the magistrate to dismiss a 
case for lack of probable cause when the charges are not supported by evidence, 
presented by the State, that could lead to a reasonable inference that the accused 
committed the offense. This is exactly the reason why the magistrate correctly dismissed 
the charges against Mr. Ramirez. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the standard for probable cause, albeit lower than 
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence, is not so 
low that the prosecution can simply step over it in order to bindover a defendant for trial. 
It must produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged. The State 
fell short of this requirement when they failed to produce evidence, from which a 
5 A copy of the magistrate's ruling is included as Addendum B in the Appellant's 
Addenda. 
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reasonable person could infer, that Mr. Ramirez possessed the drug paraphernalia or that 
he intended to exercise dominion over the items. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT MR. RAMIREZ POSSESSED 
OR INTENDED TO EXERCISE DOMINION OR CONTROL OVER 
THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
At Patrick Robert Ramirez's preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the 
charges against Mr. Ramirez because the State's evidence could not support a reasonable 
inference that Mr. Ramirez was in possession of drug residue and paraphernalia 
discovered by police in a motel room that he had previously occupied. (R. 36.) 
A. Bindover Standard 
Mr. Ramirez acknowledges that the State's rendition of the bindover standard in 
their appellate brief is an accurate portrayal of Utah's case law on the matter. See (Br. 
Appt. at 10-12.) He would only add that, when determining whether to bindover a 
defendant for trial, the magistrate is also within his or her discretion to make credibility 
determinations in regard to the evidence, and may discount or disregard evidence that 
does not support a reasonable belief as to an element of the charges. See State v. Ingram, 
2006 UT App 237 f19 ,139 P.3d 286 (citing Virgin, 2006 UT 29 at % 25). 
6 
B. Mr. Ramirez was not in constructive possession of the controlled 
substance or drug paraphernalia and there was no evidence that he 
intended to exercise control over the drug residue and paraphernalia 
The State's argument is somewhat misleading in regard to the magistrate's 
decision to dismiss the case against Mr. Ramirez: The Appellant's argument is that the 
magistrate "declined to bindover, however, because, in his view, "[e]very reasonable 
inferenceyrom the evidence" was that "Defendant did not know of the presence of the 
drug residue and paraphernalia." (Br. Appt. at 13 (quoting portions of the magistrate's 
order denying bindover).) Although the magistrate did mention this in his order, he 
clearly stated that his decision was based on the lack of evidence that could support a 
reasonable inference that Mr. Ramirez intended to exercise control over the drug residue 
and paraphernalia. See (R. 36.) 
Because Mr. Ramirez was incarcerated at the time of the search, the State could 
only argue that Mr. Ramirez was in constructive possession of the items found in the 
motel room. (R. 41 at 5:19, R. 36.) The Utah Supreme Court explained that constructive 
possession occurs "when there [is] a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the 
drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and 
intent to exercise control over the drugs or paraphernalia." Layman, 1999 UT 79, H 15, 
985 P.2d 911 (citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). The 
State argued that because Mr. Ramirez had, among countless others, rented the motel 
room in which the contraband was found, it was somehow reasonable to infer that it was 
he, and he alone, who could have possessed the contraband. See (R. 41 at 27:2-9.) 
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However, in an analogous case, this court held that cocaine found in the back seat of the 
defendant's vehicle was insufficient on its own to show a nexus between the defendant 
and the cocaine. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991). The Court stated 
that "[a] sufficient nexus is not established by mere ownership and/or occupancy of the 
premises upon which the drugs were found . . . especially when occupancy is not 
exclusive." Id. (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d at 319) (inner quotations omitted). The State's 
case relies almost exclusively on the fact that Mr. Ramirez had rented the room, which an 
officer on cross examination conceded was not under the exclusive control of Mr. 
Ramirez. (R. 41 at 23:11-14.) 
To bolster its argument, the State used an analogy that if the magistrate did not 
find that Mr. Ramirez was in constructive possession of the contraband that: 
any time an officer pulls someone out of a car and puts them into handcuffs 
he no longer has power to possess anything in that vehicle, so anything they 
find in that vehicle can't be chargeable to that person because they no 
longer have power to exercise control over that. (R. 41 at 31:15-19.) 
This analogy can only apply to the facts of this case if the following are also added to the 
hypothetical: 1. the police arrested the defendant when he was away from his vehicle 2. it 
was a rental vehicle that had been driven by countless others prior to the defendant 3. a 
number of other people had access to the vehicle before and after the police arrested the 
defendant and 4. enough time passed between the arrest and the search of the car that any 
number of the people mentioned above could have had access to the vehicle and its 
contents. Aside from such an analogy not passing muster under the Salas criteria, it also 
8 
highlights Mr. Ramirez's assertion that the State did not produce evidence that could 
support a reasonable belief that Mr. Ramirez possessed the contraband. See Salas, 820 
P.2datl388. 
Furthermore, the State, in its effort to show that Mr. Ramirez was in constructive 
possession of the contents of the motel room, bore the burden to produce evidence at the 
preliminary hearing that could support that there was a sufficient nexus between Mr. 
Ramirez and the contraband because it is required to produce evidence of all the elements 
charged. See Layman, 1999 UT 79, % 15, 985 P.2d 911. The State's only evidence to 
support this nexus is that Mr. Ramirez had rented that motel room at some point: it 
offered no evidence of when he rented that room, how long he rented it for, who he 
rented it with, etc. (R. 41 at 33:19:22.) The State also argued that there was no evidence 
that anyone else had been in the room. Id. This argument, if accepted, would shift the 
burden to Mr. Ramirez, and require him to prove his innocence by showing proof that 
there had been no one else in the room. It was the State's responsibility to produce 
evidence that could support that no one else had been in the room, and not only did they 
fail to produce such evidence, the officers' preliminary hearing testimony was that Mr. 
Ramirez was not the only person with access to the motel room; the testimony showed 
that numerous people, including individuals not associated with the motel, had ready 
access to the motel room. (R. 41 at 6:19-20, 23:11-13.) 
The State also argued that because Mr. Ramirez said that he had a drug problem it 
can be inferred that the drug residue and paraphernalia belonged to him. (R. 41 at 33:6-
9 
10.) However, this spontaneous statement also included that Mr. Ramirez injected drugs 
and did not smoke them. Id. The fact that Mr. Ramirez stated that he only injects, and 
does not smoke, drugs does not lead to an inference that Mr. Ramirez possessed drugs 
and paraphernalia designed to be smoked, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the prosecution. See Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389 (holding that spontaneous statements by a 
defendant indicated he did not know about the drugs with which he was being charged 
with possession). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, Mr. Ramirez respectfully requests this court to 
affirm the decision of the magistrate and uphold the dismissal of the charges against him. 
DATED this 25th Day of June, 2010. 
Ryan iX-Stout 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
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